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o Hoctars' Choice
Is America's Choice''
The Physician in US Cigarette Advertisements, 1930-1953
In the 1930s and 1940s, smoking be-
came the norm for both men and
women in the llnited States, and a ma-
jority of physicians smoked. At the
same time, there was rising public anx-
iety about the health risks of cigarette
smoking. One strategic response of to-
bacco companies was to devise ad-
vertising referring directly to physi-
cians. As ad campaigns featuring
physicians developed tfirough the early
1950s, tobacco executives used the
doctor image to assure tiie consumer
that their respective brands were safe.
These advertisements also sug-
gested that the individual physicians'
clinical judgment should continue to
be the arbiter of the harms of ciga-
rette smoking even as systematic
health evidence accumulated. How-
ever, by 1954, industry strategists
deemed physician images in adver-
tisements no longer credible in the
face of growing public concern about
tbe health evidence implicating ciga-
rettes. {Rm J Public Health. 2006;
96:222-232. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2005.
066654}
Martha N, Gardner, PhD, and Allan M, Brandt, PhD
IN 1946, THE RJ REYNOLDS
Tobacco Company initiated a
major new advertising campaign
for Camels, one of the most popu-
lai- brands in the United States,
Working to establish dominance
in a highly competitive market
Reynolds centered their new cam-
paign on the memorable slogan,
"More doctors smoke Camels
than any other cigarette," This
phrase would be the mainstay of
their advertising for the next 6
years. Touting surveys conducted
by "three leading independent re-
search orgajuzadons," one typical
advertisement proclaimed that ac-
cording to "nationwide" surveys
of 113 597 doctors "from every
branch of medicine." Camel was
the brand smoked by most re-
sprondents. It also asserted that
this statistic was an "actual fact"
not a "casual claim,"
In realit>', this "independent"
surveying was conducted by RJ
Reynoids's advertising agency, the
William Esty Company, whose
employees questioned physicians
about their smoking habits at
medical conferences and in their
offices. It appears that most doc-
tors were surveyed about their
cigarette brand of choice just after
being provided complimentary
cartons of Camels.'
Even without the suspect na-
ture of the data used in the "More
Doctors" campaign, the frequent
appearance of physicians in ad-
vertisements for cigarettes in this
and many other ad campaigns is
both striking a:id ironic from the
vantage point of the early 21st
century. Any association between
physicians and cigarettes—the
leading cause of death in the
United States—is jarring given our
cuirent scientific knowledge
ahout the relationship of smoking
to disease and the fact that fewer
than 4% of physicians in the
United States now smoke,^
In 1930s and 1940s, how-
ever, smoking had become the
norm for botli men and women
in the United States—and a ma-
jority of physicians smoked,'' At
the same time, however, rising
public and scientific anxiety
existed about cigarettes' risks
to health, creating concern
among the tobacco companies.
The physician constituted an
evocative, reassuring figure to
include in their advertisements.
In retrospect, these advertise-
ments are a powerful reminder
of the cultural authority physi-
cians and medicine held in
American society during the mid-
20th century, and the manner in
which tobacco executives aligned
their product with that authorily,
Even before modem epidemi-
oiogicaJ research would demon-
strate the health risks of smok-
ing at mid-century, there had
already arisen considerable con-
cem about the health impact of
cigarette use,' Questions of the
moral and health consequences
of cigarette smoking that bad
been prevalent at the beginning
of the 20th century still lin-
gered. Although many physi-
cians were unconvinced by this
older research, some had begun
to recognize a disturbing in-
crease in lung cancer, and some
had also started to consider the
respiratory and cardiovascular
effects of smoking. A common
theorj' held that cancer resulted
ftxjm chronic irritation to the af-
fected tissue, and many won-
dered whether cigarette smoke
"irritated" lung tissue in this
222 Public Health Then and Now I Peer Reviewed Gardner American Journal of Public Health February 2006, Vol 96, No, 2PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
Well aware of these concerns—
and their impact on cigarette
sales—the tobacco companies de-
vised advertising and marketing
strategies to (1) reassure the pub-
lic of the competitive health ad-
vantages of their brands, (2) re-
cruit physicians as crucial allies
in the ongoing process of market-
ing tobacco, and (3) maintain the
salience of individual clinical
judgments about the health ef-
fects of smoking in the face of
categorical scientific findings.
These elements would be of
growing importance as the healtli
effects of smoking came to be
more fully elucidated. One aspect
of these promotional strategies
was to refer directly to physicians
in botb images and words. We
explored how physicians were
depicted in these advertisements
and how the ad campaigns devel-
oped as health evidence implicat-
ing cigarette .smoking accumu-
lated by the early 1950s.
EARLY MEDICAL CLAIMS
American Tobacco, the leader
in the splashy ad campaigns that
had made its Lucky Strike brand
dominant by the late 1920s, was
the first to mention physicians in
advertisements. The physician
was just one piece of a much
larger campaign on bebalf of
American Tobacco. As cigarette
sales grew exponentially in the
United States in the early 20th
century. Lucky Strikes had be-
come the preeminent brand
largely because of its massive
promotional elTorts. Company
president George Washington
Hill worked with ad man Albert
Lasker to develop a "reason why"
consumers should purchase their
brand. With no real scientific evi-
dence to back their claims,
American Tobacco insisted that
the "toasting" process that Lucky
Strikes tobacco underwent de-
creased throat irritation.'' In fact,
Lucky Strikes' curing process did
not significantly differ from that
of other brands.
Related campaigns empha-
sized that "Luckies" would help
consumers—especially women,
their new market—to stay slim,
since they could "Reach for a
Lucky instead of a sweet." ;\long
with these persistent health
American Tobacco, We leader
in the splashy ad campaigns
that had made its Lucky Strike
brand dominant by the
late 1920s, was the first
to mention physicians
in advertisements.
claims, a ^ical advertisement
from 1930 boldly stated that
"20,679 Physicians say 'LUCK-
IES are less irritating'" and fea-
tured a white-haired, white-
coaled doctor with a reassuring
smile (Figure 1).'
In this manner, American To-
bacco advertisements refiected
an awareness of ongoing public
concern about the potential
health effects of cigarette smok-
ing. Referring to a large number
of physicians who they claimed
backed up the superiority of
Lucky Strikes, the ad text noted
in small print that their account-
ing firm had "checked and certi-
fied" this number, independently
validating the claim.** Their ad-
vertLsing agency. Lord, Thomas
and Logan, had sent cartons of
cigarettes to physicians in 1926,
1927, and 1928 and asked them
to answer whether "Lucky Strike
Cigarettes ... are less irritating to
sensitive and tender throats than
other cigarettes."
Ibuting the toasting process in
the accompanjong cover letter,
adveitising executive Thomas
Logan pointed out the virtues of
Lucky Strikes and claimed that
FIGURE 1—Advertisement:
"20,679" physicians say 'LUCKIES
are less irritating.'"
Source. Magazine of Wall Street.
July 26, 1930.
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HGURE 2—Advertisement: "A
report on the findings of a
group of doctors.*"
Source. Saturday Evening Post.
October 16,1937.
they had heard from "a good
many people" that they could
smoke Lucky Strikes "with perfeet
comfort to their throats." Ameri-
can Tobacco used the physicians'
responses to this survey to vali-
date their claim that Lucky Strikes
were "less irritating," claiming it
confirmed their enduring asser-
tion that their "toasting" process
made cigarettes less irritating.
Toasting, the advertisement went
on to explain, was "your throat
protection against irritation—
against cough."^ Although there
was no substantive evidence that
this process of curing tobacco was
superior to the methods tised by
other companies, American To-
bacco made the bold claim and
tied it to physicians.
By the mid-1930s. Philip
Morris, a newcomer to the mar-
ket took the use of health claims
a step ftirther, designing a cam-
paign that used a new strategy of
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS
)F A GROUP OF DOCTORS*
tiocror kcpr a r«wd .f ..,,,
referring directly to research con-
ducted by physicians. Both in
magazines targeted to the general
public and in medical journals,
Philip Morris claimed tbat their
cigarettes were proven to be
"less irritating." For example, in
a 1937 Saturday Evening Post ad-
vertisement, Philip Morris's ball-
mark spokesman, bellhop Johnny
Roventini, announced that accord-
ing to "a report on the findings of
a group of doctors ... when
smokers changed to Philip Morris,
every case of irritation cleared
completely and definitely im-
proved" (Figure 2). The text re-
ferred specifically to faithfijl doc-
tors "day after day... [keeping] a
record" to "prove conclusively"
the decrease in irritation."^
These "findings" resulted from
an aggressive pursuit of physi-
cians and focused on the concept
that adding a chemical to their
cigarettes, diethylene-glycol. made
them moister and less irritating
than other brands. As Alan Blum,
editor of the New York State Jour-
nal of Medicine, explained in bis
1983 assessment of cigarette
advertisements that had appeared
in the journal from 1927 to
1953, Philip Morris—armed with
papers written hy researchers that
the company bad sponsored—
attempted to use "clinical proof
to establish the superiority of
their brand." Specifically, Colum-
bia University pharmacologist
Michael Mulinos and physiologist
Frederick Flinn produced findings
(on the basis of tbe injection of
diethylene-glycol into the eyes of
rabbits) that became the center-
piece of the Philip Morris claim
that diethylene-glycol was less irri-
tating, although other researchers
not spoasored by Philip Morris
disputed these findings. ^
Thi.s highly successful campaign
made Philip Morris into a major
brand for tbe first time.'"* As a
1943 advertisement in the Satur-
day Evening Post proclaimed,
Philip Morris provided "[fjull re-
ports in medical journals by men,
higb in their profession—regularly
offered to physidans on request."'
These advertisements used
physicians and science to make
their particular brand appeal to
the broader public while at the
same time they curried favor with
physicians. Company operatives
appeared at medical conventions
and in physidans' private offices,
providing pbysidans with free dg-
arettes and reprints of sdentific
articles on the subject. As a 1936
Portune Magazine profile of Pbilip
Morris & Company made clear:
TTie object of all this pmpa-
ganda is not only to make doc-
tors smoke Philip Morris dga-
rettcs. thus setting an example
for impressionable patients, but
also tn implant tbe findings of
Mtilmos so strongly in tlie med-
ical mind tbat tbe doctors will
actually advise their coughing,
rtieumy, and fur-ttingut'd pa-
tienLs to switcli to Pbilip Morris
on the ground that Ihey are less
irritating."
With careful, deferentiiil ap-
peals to physicians, Philip Morris
aimed to gain tbeir approval. The
spedfic positive references to clin-
ical evidence tbat had appeared
in medical journals helped to es-
tablish and maintain this connec-
tion between physicians and to-




According to a number of ac-
counts, medical professionals-
having themselves joined the
ranks of inveterate smokers-
doubted the connection between
smoking and disease after
1930."' Although hygienic and
physiological concerns continued
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to be voiced, clinical medidne
claimed that individual assess-
ment and judgment was re-
quired.'^ During this era, there
was a strong tendency to avoid
altogether causal hypotheses in
matters so clearly complex.
There was—and would remain—
a powerful notion that risk is
largely variable and thus, most
appropriately evaluated and
monitored at the individual, clini-
cal level."*
According to this logic, some
people could smoke without risk
to health, whereas others appar-
ently suffered untoward and
sometimes serious consequences.
As cigarette smokiiig became in-
creasingly popular in the early
decades of the 20th century,
medicine offered no new insight
into how best to evaluate such
vaiiabiiity other than on an indi-
vidual post hoc basis. If, and
when, an individual developed
symptoms, a physician might ap-
propriately advise restricting or
eliminating tobacco. As a restilt,
rather than being located within
the sphere of public health, ciga-
rette use remained within the
domain of clinical assessment
and prescription. The tobacco in-
dustry would actively seek to
keep cigarettes within this clinical
domain.
For the tobacco companies,
physicians' approval of their prod-
uct could prove to be essential,
especially since patients often
brought smoking-related symp-
toms and health concerns to the
attention of their doctors. Through
advertisements appearing in the
p^s of medical journals for the
first time in the 1930s, tobacco
companies worked to develop
close, mutually benefidai relation-
ships with physicians and their
professional organizations. These
advertisements became a ready
source of income for numerous
medical organizations and jour-
nals, including the New England
Journal of Medidne and the Journal
of the American Medical Associa-
tion (JAMA), as well as many
branches and bulletins of local
medical associations.'''
Coming during the Great De-
pression, the placement of adver-
tisements in medical journals
helped to keep medical organiza-
tions financially solvent when re-
sources were scarce. Philip Morris
praised physidans in these adver-
tisements with taglines like "Every
doctor is a doubter" and "Doctor
as judge" as they appealed to
physicians' expert ability to evalu-
ate the evidence, referring them
to scientific articles that they
daimed illtistrated the superiority
of their brand. As one sudi adver-
tisement explained in its entirety
in 1939, "If you advise patients
on smoking—and what doctor does
not—you will find highly impor-
tant data in the studies listed
below. May we send you a set of
reprints?""'^
Not only, then, did physidans'
findings help to make the Philip
Morris brand appear superior in
the eyes of the public, but the
company also turned to physi-
dans with great effect Physicians
became, through this process, an




Althou^ Philip Morris may
have created this strategy—and
gained a leg up in tbe competitive
cigarette mai'ket-Rj Reynolds be-
came the leading force in solicit-
ing physidans. Reynolds created a
Medical Relations Di\Tsion (MRD)
in the early 1940s that became
the base of their aggressive physi-
cian/health claims promotional
sti-ategy. They directly solicited
doctors in a 1942 advertisement
that appeared in medical journals
describing the MHD. Declaring
that "[tlhe most significant med-
ical data is derived from the
every-day records of practising
[sicj physicians," the text asserted
"your office record reports in stich
cases should prove interesting to
study."^'
The MRD, induding its long-
time director. A. Grant Clarke,
was in fact a part of RJ Reynolds's
advertising firm, rather than any
kind of professional scientific
division of the company. The
MRD's mailing addmss was tbe
side door of tbe William Hsty Ad-
vertising Company.^' The work
of the MRD focused on promot-
ing Camels mainly through find-
ing and courting researchers to
belp suKstantiate the health
claims RJ Reynolds made in theii-
advertisements.
In the late 1930s and early
1940s, Clarke—wbo had no
medical or scientific training-
corresponded with many re-
searchers who were pursuing
questions relating to smoking
and health. The MRD financed
research tbat Reynolds then
referred to in advertisements.
Rather than emphasizing claims
of moistness as Philip Morris
had done, RJ Reynolds foctised
on nicotine absorption, insisting
that Camels were the slowest
burning of all cigai-ettes. The
safety of nicotine—like the issue
of chronic irritation—was a
source of ongoing concern;
Reynolds maintained that nico-
tine was "the chief component
of pharmacologic and physiolog-
ical significance." Camels' slow
burning rate, their advertise-
ments now asserted, decreased
nicotine absorption; as a result,
Camels offered smokers an
advantage over other, faster-
burning ^^
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FIGURE 3—Advertisement:
"Philip Morris invites you to
the... Doctor's ^^
As they made this claim, RJ
Reynolds also asked physicians to
use the infomialion when advis-
ing their patients. They referred
to "a number of reports from
physicians who recommend
Camels" and called on those read-
ing the advertisement to send in
their own ctimcal experiences and
to request copies of medical jour-
nal articles from the MRD that
proved their assertions, llse ofler
served to legitimate R] Reynolds's
claims. The main article dted diti
not in fact address Camels specifi-
cally, although it did make the
claim that slow-burning cigarettes
were superior.^"* With no deai-
knowledge about whether nico-
tine absorption was even an area
that should concern smokers, and
with very little data showing
Camels' slower absorption, the
scientific basis for Reynolds's
claim remained obsnire.
Nonetheless, such health claims
would become the basis for tbe
aggressive recruitment of physi-
cian.s as allies in the promotion of
their products and brands. To-
bacco companies' participation in
medical conventions provided a
deal- example of their efforts to
appeal to physidans. For example,
sodal commentator Bernard
Devoto described tbe exbibit hall
of the 1947 American Medical
Assodadon (AMA) convention in
Atlantic City, where doctors
"lined up by the hundred" to
receive iree cigarettes.^^ At the
1942 AMA annual convention,
Philip Morris provided a lounge in
which doctors could relax and so-
dalize. The lounge, an advertise-
ment explained, was "designed for
your conifort. Drop in. Rest...
read ... smoke ... or jtist chat"^^
(Figure 3).
Besides welcoming physidans
to the convention, Reynolds
touted their scientific research
into dgarcttes. In an advertise-
ment that appeared in medical
journals across the country in the
weeks before tbe 1942 AMA
meeting, Reynolds reiterated their
claim tliat 'Tt]he .smoke of slow-
burnmg CAMELS contained less
nicotine than that of die 4 other
largest-selling brands tested," and
condnued to direct its health
theme at doctors. The advertise-
ment also referred to "the inter-
esting features of the Camel ciga-
rette exhibit," including "the
dramatic visualization of nicotine
absorpdon from dgarette smoke
in the human respiratory tract"
and "giant photo-murals of Camel
laboratory research experiments."
At a dme when laboratory sd-
ence had garnered espedal admi-
ration, the advertisement linked
clinical medicine to the authority
of invesdgadve science. '
Along with directly solidting
physidans, the tobacco advertise-
ments portrayed a glowing image
of physicians in both medical
journals and popular magazines.
In advertisements that were
precursors to the "More Doctors"
slogan, Rj Reynolds spedfically
featured dedicated physidans
serving their country and its sol-
diers during World Wai' 11. As a
1944 advertisement that ap-
peared in Life Magazine entitled
"Doctor of Medicine ... and
Morale" illustrated, doctors on the
front received hero status:
He wears the same uniform....
He shares the same risks as Ihe
man with (he giin, , , , Yes, the
medical man in the service
today is a figlitiiig man ihroiigh
and through, exeept he fights
without a gun. . . . [Hit's a
trusted fnend to every fighting
man,. . IHjc well knows the
comfort and eheer Ihnre Ls
in a few moments' relaxation
with a goixl cigarelle , , . like
Camel ... the Favorite dgarette
with men in atl the serviecs.""
With this and similar advertise-
ments, the positive place that
physicians held in American cul-
ture was both exploited and un-
derlined by RJ Reynolds's adver-
tising scribes. Linking physicians
to wartime patriotism further ele-




When the "More Doctors"
campaign began in January 1946,
it also focused on die respected
and romandc image the medical
profession had achieved in Ameri-
can sodety.^" Featuring 6 illustra-
tions of physidans with patients—
in the laboratory or sitting back
with dgarette in hand—this first
advertisement personalized the
physidan for the readers of such
popular magazines as Ladies'
Home journal-And 7ime.'"'Pref-
aced with the bold statement that
"Every dodor in private pracdce
was asked:—family physidans,
surgeons, spedalists ... doctors in
eveiy branch of medicine," the
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advertisement touted the thor-
oughness of their survey and in-
sisted that "yes, your doctor was
asked ... along with thousands
and thousands of other doctors
from Maine to California."
By linking their depiction of
physicians to the consumer's own
physician. Reynolds brought im-
mediacy to their claims. Any fears
that smoking might be harmful
were also easily contradicted by
the physician's being a smoker
himself. Admirable, forthright
physicians—including the con-
sumer's own—had "named their
choice," and that choice, the ad-
vertisement insisted, was Camels,
hands down.
Even though a few of these ad-
vertisements did appear in print,
the Reynolds advertising depart-
ment soon realized that they
might have overstepped their evi-
dence. With the Federal Trade
Commission already challenging
suspected health claims in ciga-
rette advertisements, RJ Reynolds
toned down their copy, quickly
shifting their claim to "113,597
physicians" surveyed rather than
fl//physidans.'"
At least some individual physi-
cians questioned the original
claim. In a letter to Howard T
Behrman, a physidan who had re-
quested "more specific Intbrma-
tion concerning the survey of
physidans' smoking preference,"
RJ Reynolds advertising executive
W T. Smither assured liim that
the surveying had heen thorough
and sdentific. Explaining that the
question about brand preference
had been embedded in a survey
that included less relevant topics-
such as medical journals, medical
conventions, and ntimerous con-
sumer products—Smither empha-
sized how 3 independent surveys
had garnered "similar findings,
and in doing so, sei"ved to conlirm
the acctiracy of each ^^
Beyond the questionable meth-
ods used to gather data. Reynolds
was also careful how they de-
scribed the survey findings in ad-
vertising copy, making sure to
avoid conflating doctors' choice of
a dgarette with any belief on their
part that Camels were healthier.
In theii- advertisements, Ihey as-
serted, "Doctors smoke for pleas-
ure just like the rest of us."''^ In-
ternally, Reynoids's advertising
executives cautioned William
Esty. their advertising company,
to be careful of what they
claimed, insisting that "in no way
[shotiid] the copy.., intimate that
doctors recommended smoking of
CAMELS, [or] that CAMELS are
good for health." '"* This caution-
ary approach reflected the grow-
ing industry concern about poten-
tial regulation and litigation."^^
Even so, the "More Doctors"
campaign resonated effectively
with American cultural values
about contemporary medidne.
Throughout 1946. the slogan
flooded print, radio, and television
media. Doctors were often ideal-
ized, as in the 1946 advertise-
ment "I'll be right over!" Here, a
middle-aged physidan, in bed in
his pajamas, telephone in hand, is
about to grab the black bag lying
ready on his bedside table and
make a middle-of-the-night visit to
a patient in need:
24 hours a day your doctor is
"on duty."... [l]n his daily rou-
tine he lives more drama, and
display.s more devotion to the
oath he has taken, than the
most imagijiative mind could
ever invent. And hf asks no
speciai credit. When there's a
job to do, he dops it. A few
winks of sleep. , a few puffs of
a eigaretle. . . and he's back at
the job again.^''
This neighbortiood family
physidan is saintly and deserving
of trust, r'eprescntiiig (as another
1946 advertisement explained)
"an honored profession ... his
professional reputation and his
record of service are his most
chenshed possessions,"'*' The im-
portance of professional autonomy
loomed large, and tlie industry
was eager to sustain this view. As
physidans geared up to fight (he
Truman administration s national
health insurance proposals, their
image as loyal and deserving of
respect was especially important"^
Along with providing images
of professional trustworthiness
and dedication, the "More Doc-
tors" ad campaign also exploited
the popular faith and admiration
of medical science and technol-
ogy. In one such "More Doctors"
ad. a 5-year-old girl sits next to
her mother in a doctor's office
and proclaims, "I'm going to
grow a hundred years old" to the
kindly man in white (Figtire 4).
FIGURE 4—Advertisemerrt from
the Camels "More Doctors"
series: "I'm going to grow
a hundred years oM!"
Source. Good Housekeeping.
July 1946.
More Doctors smoke (>amcls
N
CAMI:I.S
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Referring to the "amazing strides
in medical science [that] have
added years to life expectancy,"
the advertisement goes on to
"thank medical science for that.
Thank your doctor and tliou-
sands like him.. . toiling cease-
lessly. .. that you and yours may
enjoy a longer, better life."''*
With medical advances having
Figure 5—Advertisement: "How mild
can a cigarette be?"
Source. OMo State Journal of
Medicine, iuly 1949:45:670.
captured popular imaginadon,
connecdons drawn between sd-
endfic discovery and Camel-
smoking doctors added to the ap-
peal of their cigarette of choice.""'
MEDICAL AUTHORITY
AND TOBACCO
After the inidal onslaught of
heroic physidans and medical
miracles in 1946. the "More
Doctors" advertisements in 1947
and 1948 continued to remind
readers about the survey as the
focus of the adverdsements
shifted. Tbe main slogan of one
sucb campaign was "Experience
is tlie best teacher." In this series
of adverdsements, Rj Reynolds
explained that the cigarette short-
age created by the war had
forced many to smoke whatever
brands were available, and this
experience, they claimed, had
made the superiority of Camels'
quality dearly evident. The
smoker was able to tell the difler-
ence between brands, and such
"experience" translated to other
areas where someone might have
know how. When the slogan ap-
peared in magazines like Life and
Saturday Evening Post, the "expe-
rience" dted might be that of a
talented celebrity athlete able to
discern quality in his or her
sport. In medical journals, the
references were to famous scien-
tific researchers. These advertise-
ments championed physicians
and medicine and reminded their
audience again that "More doc-
tors smoked Camels" as they also
continued to praise science,""
But the idea of "experience"
also figured into another preva-
lent theme communicated in RJ
Reynolds's adverdsing—that of in-
dividual authority, both the
physician's and the individual
consumer's. The quesdon of
throat irritation so central to
many 1920s and 1930s ad cam-
paigns again emerged here as RJ
Reynolds introduced a "mildness"
theme. With the central claim
that Camels did not irritate the
throat, Reynolds featured both
the physician-researcher and the
everyday smoker to convince
readers of Camels' mildness.
In July 1949 issues of both
local and nadonal medical jour-
nals, Rj Reynolds asked, "How
mild can a dgarette be?" In
answering this quesdon, the ad-
verdscment juxtaposed a "doc-
tors report"—illustrated with a
physician, cigaiette in hand and
head mirror sd'apped ai'ound his
brow—with a "smokers report"—
illustrated with a smiling "Sylvia
MacNeill, secretary." Physidans,
the adverdsement explained, had
concluded after scientific invesd-
gadon that there was "not one
single case of throat initadon"
from smoking Camel dgarettes.
In fact, "noted throat specialists"
had conducted "weekly examina-
dons" of padents in making this
determinadon. Reynolds used
this depicdon of careful, clinical
observation to substandate their
health claim (Figure 5).^^
The adverdsement went be-
yond medical authority, however,
asserdng that smokers didn't even
have to take their pbysidans'
word for it Instead, they could
take their "own personal 30-day
test," as Sylvia MacNeill had done.
She concluded that she "knew"
that "Camels are the mildest best-
tasdng dgarette I ever smoked."
Advertisements in popular maga-
zines took smokers' ability to
judge for themselves even further,
with Elana O'Brian, real estate
broker, declaring in a typical ex-
ample, "I don't need my doctor's
report to know Camels are mild"
'Yhe adverdsement underlined
her asserdon with photos of 6
other smokers from various walks
of life under the heading "Thou-
sands more agreel"^'
In another example, Anne Jef-
freys, a stage and screen star, in-
sisted, "The test was fijn and it
was sensible'." Parallel to earlier
solidtadon of physidans' opin-
ions, in this series of adverdse-
ments RJ Reynolds requested
that smokers determine the
safety of Camels on their own
and praised their acumen. With
some advertisements calling on
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smokers to "Prove it yourself!' and
even guaranteeing a money-back
guarantee for dissatisfied cus-
tomers, Reynolds insisted on the
superiority of their product. '•*
These advertisements worked to
subvert the emerging population-
based epidemiological findings
by emphasizing the primacy of
"individual" judgment.
By 1952, advertising copy
went beyond the typical individ-
ual smoker to emphasize the
sheer volume of people who
chose Camels as their cigarette.
Highlighting that Camel was
"America's most popular cigarette
by billions." the ad copy men-
tioned that "long before Camel
reached those heights, repeated
surveys showed that more doctors
smoke Camels than any olher
cigarette.""* The cigarette's popu-
larity in itself became a selling
point; how could so many people
be wrong? And physicians' ciga-
rette choice served to contirm
this popularity. As the heading of
a similar advertisement ex-




Ultimately, however, the use
of physicians in Camel advertise-
ments could not be sustained as
the health evidence against ciga-
rettes accumulated. When dis-
turbing scientific results connect-
ing lung cajicer and cigarettes
began to emerge, Camel adver-
tisements shifted away from
physicians' judgment and author-
ity. In 1950, the publication of
the now-famous work of Evarts
Graham and Kmst Wynder in
the United States—as well as that
of A. Bradford Hill and Richard
Doll in the United Kingdom-
showed that there was cause for
alarm.'*'' The reporting of their
findings connecting lung cancer
to cigarette smoking in national
magazines like Time and
Reader's Digest—and the corre-
sponding declines in sales and
stock prices—forced tobacco ex-
ecutives to assess strategies for
responding to growing medical
and public concerns about their
product.*"^
By 1953. when Wynder, Gra-
ham, and their colleague Adele
Croninger published laboratory
fmdings confirming that ciga-
rettes were carcinogenic, scien-
tific fijidings constituted a critical
threat to the industry."''* Tobacco
executives were well aware both
of these findings and of the pub-
lic attention they were receiving,
and their statements and actions
reflected an understanding that
this new scientific evidence con-
stituted a full-scale crisis for their
corporations.
Most notably, company execu-
tives realized that they would
have to work together in the face
of the scientific evidence. Al-
though each company still sought
an advantage over its competitors,
the new healtli evidence threat-
ened the hilvre of the entire in-
dustiy. In December 1953, the to-
bacco executives met to devise a
joint strategy. They hired promi-
nent public relations firm Hill &
Knowlton to aid in this effort. As
a planning memo makes deay,
health claims were considered to
be no longer viable. According to
Edward Dakin, a Hill & Knowlton
executive, it would be critical to
Develop some understanding
with companies that, on this
problem, none is going to seek
a competitive advantage by in-
ferring to its public that its
product is less risky than oth-
ere. (No claims that special fil-
lers or toasting, or expert selec-
tion of tobacco, 01' extra leii(rth
in the butt, or anything else,
makes a given brand less likely
(o cause you-know-what. No
"PIay-Safe-with-Luckies" idea—
or with Caniels or with ajiy-
thing else.)^"
Hill & Knowlton's advice was
that the industry as a whole must
desist from health claims that
had been a centerpiece of the ad-
vertising that featured physicians.
Such claims, the agency now
contended, would now draw at-
tention to the "health scare." as
they professed to call it.^'
Tobacco executives were well aware both
of these findings and of the public attention
they were receiving, and their statements
and actions reflected an understanding
that this new scientific evidence constituted
a full-scale crisis for their corporations.
In popular magazines, the last
notable reference to doctors in an
advertisement came in 1954,
After the other tobacco compa-
nies had left such marketing tech-
niques behind, Liggett and Myers
{which had declined participation
in the joint industry program
directed by Hill & Knowlton)
made the claim that their L&M
filter cigarette was "Just what the
doctor ordered!" In a typical ad-
vertisement that appeared in a
February issue of Life magazine,
Hollywood star Fredric March
made this assertion after having
i-L'ad the letter written hy a
"Dr Darkis" that was inset into
the advertisement Darkis ex-
plained in this letter that L&M
filters used a "highly purified
eilpha cellulose" that was "entirety
harmless" and "effectively filtered
the smoke" (Figure 6),
Dr Darkis was in fact not a
medical doctor at all but a re-
.search chemist, yet another ex-
ample of misrepresentation in a
tobacco ad.^^ More significantly,
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FIGURE G—Actor Fredric March in
an advertisement for L&M RHers:
"This ts K."
Source. Life Magazine. February 22,
1954.
this use of implicit doctor en-
dorsement of cigarettes would
not occur again in American ad-
vertising after this campaign.
Much in the way that the indus-
try had used doctors to reassure
smokers in the 1940s, filter ciga-
rettes were heconiing the indus-
try's new strategy for appealing
to consumers, whose concerns
about the health risks of smoking
would be repeatedly confirmed
by new research studies. In
1950, filter dgarettes were 2'Vii
of the US dgarette market; by
1960, they were 50"/[j.^-'
In medical journals, the last-
gasp attempt by a tobacco com-
pany to ally itself with physicians
came in 1953, when the Loril-
lard Company appealed to physi-
cians as they promoted their new
filter dgarette, Kent. These ad-
vertisements queried, "Have you
tried this experiment, doctor?"
and "Why is it, doctor, that one
filter cigarette gives so much
more protection than any other?"
One advertisement mentioned
how "thousands" of physicians at
a recent AMA convention wit-
nessed "a convincing demonstra-
tion. . . [of] the effectiveness of
the MICRONITE FILTER" and
included photos of the experi-
ment demonstrated there. In
their marketing of Kent, Loriltard
had created a campaign reminis-
cent of those designed by Philip
Morris and RJ Reynolds in the
1930s and early 1940s.^*' Just as
in those earlier advertisements,
Lorillard called on physicians to
interpret scientific results using
their individual, clinical judg-
ment But tbe swift and vehe-
ment reaction to these advertise-
ments clearly illustrated bow the
social and scientific climate had
shifted, A 1954 JAMA editorial
labeled the reference to physi-
cians and the MIA convention
an "unauthorized and medically
unethical use of the prestige and
reputation of the American Med-
ical Assodation. "^^ No longer
could tobacco companies count
on physicians to serve as public
advocates of their product.
In fact, in \953JAMA had de-
cided to stop accepting cigarette
advertisements in its publications
and banned cigarette companies
from exhibiting their products at
AMA conventions.^'* After con-
ducting its own survey of physi-
cians, the AMA explained in a
letter to tobacco companies that
"a large percentage of physicians
interviewed expressed their dis-
approval" of dgarette advertise-
ments m medical journals. Other
JAMA advertisers had come to
dislike having their products
appear next to cigarette adver-
tisements as well.'^ With tbe
AMA publidy condemning the
Kent ad campaign In 1954 as
"hucksterism," it became even
more clear to tobacco companies
that the purported allegiance
with physidans was no longer
feasible or effective.
One additional indicator of
the growing medical disdain for
cigarettes was the very fact that
many physidans who followed
tbe emerging health evidence
began the [irocess of giving up
smoking. According to one study
of physicians' smoking practices
in Massachusetts, nearly 52%
had reported being regular
smokers in 1954 (over 30% re-
ported smoking at least a pack
per day); just 5 years later, only
39% were regular smokers. Ad-
ditionally, only 18% now re-
ported consumption of a pack or
more per day.^"
Although the industry would
continue to solicit physicians
witb materials disputing the rela-
tionship between smoking and
disease and would also seek out
physicians who doubted the
harmfulness of cigarettes in
order to imdermine emerging
scientific findings, such efforts
would be gi^eeted with rising
skepticism.'''^ The era of explicit
use of pbysicitins and health
claims to promote smoking had
ended even though the AMA
would not publicly acknowledge
the harms of cigarette smoking
until 1978."" The smoking
physician had become a visual
oxymoron. The industry would
turn to new images and more so-
phisticated strategies to hawk
their dangerous product. •
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